



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MARCH 8, 2022

***Flash Report Series – U.S. Capitol
Building Window Installation,
Preservation and Repair: Before and
After January 6, 2021***

Flash Report 2022-0003-IE-P

MISSION

The OIG promotes efficiency and effectiveness to deter and prevent fraud, waste and mismanagement in AOC operations and programs. Through value added, transparent and independent audits, evaluations and investigations, we strive to positively affect the AOC and benefit the taxpayer while keeping the AOC and Congress fully informed.

VISION

The OIG is a high-performing team, promoting positive change and striving for continuous improvement in AOC management and operations. We foster an environment that inspires AOC workforce trust and confidence in our work.



Summary Highlights

Flash Report Series – U.S. Capitol Building Window Installation, Preservation, and Repair: Before and After January 6, 2021

March 8, 2022

Overview

On January 14, 2021, the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated a Joint Oversight Project examining the events that occurred at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. After publishing previous Flash Reports, the AOC/OIG received congressional interest in the U.S. Capitol window infrastructure. This Flash Report serves as an independent inquiry on the installation, preservation, and repair to the U.S. Capitol windows before and after the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. There have been various reporting efforts over the past year from private and public entities on the riot damage and breaching of the U.S. Capitol and as such, this Flash Report was not intended to be an all-inclusive report of the same. AOC officials and the Capitol Police Board provided select information for this inquiry, of which we incorporated as appropriate. However, the completeness of information provided hindered a more thorough examination of the related subject matter.

The AOC responded to the OIG initial request for information with general answers related to the subject matter of this inquiry. The OIG submitted a follow up inquiry to the AOC in order to clarify and expand on previous answers. However, the AOC stated they could not respond to these questions without compromising physical security and classified programs, disregarding the Inspector General's statutory authorities to receive all requested information regardless of classification. The AOC informed the OIG to address requests for information on windows in the U.S. Capitol to the Capitol Police Board.

Thereafter, the OIG directed a follow up inquiry to the Capitol Police Board, in which they requested an extension. Subsequently, the AOC submitted a formal response to the OIG as authorized by the Capitol Police Board.

Key Takeaways

The U.S. Capitol is a historic and symbolic building that requires a comprehensive security strategy for protecting congressional members, professional staff and visitors alike. The AOC and Capitol Police Board shoulder the roles and responsibilities for the operation, maintenance and security of the U.S. Capitol.

During our review we found that:

U.S. Capitol window infrastructure

considerations: Threat assessments, risk management, protective standards and heritage preservation were among the primary considerations and criteria for window infrastructure at the U.S. Capitol;

Budget: The U.S. Capitol budget needs were determined and prioritized based on various inputs and considerations (e.g., facility assessments, client requests, etc.).

- The AOC's Capitol Building jurisdiction requested and received annual funds totaling \$27,371,000 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 and did not report any funding shortfalls for FY 2020 maintenance and operations during our review.
- The U.S. Capitol had windows in need of repair on the AOC Deferred Maintenance List in FY 2020, and there are a number of windows that remain on the Deferred Maintenance List;
- In the initial aftermath of events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the AOC received approval from the House Committee



Results in Brief

Flash Report Series – U.S. Capitol Building Window Installation, Preservation, and Repair: Before and After January 6, 2021

on Appropriations to transfer \$40 million from other projects to address critical security areas and riot damage repair. Additionally, the AOC received \$283 million in the security supplemental to further address windows and doors at the U.S. Capitol but have not fully executed those funds;

Post January 6, 2021 Repair and Improvements at U.S. Capitol: All windows damaged on January 6, 2021 have been repaired.

- Additional U.S. Capitol window security enhancements remain with further improvements under design, and scheduled to be installed in the spring of 2022.
- A comprehensive physical security assessment of the Capitol complex has been completed post January 6, 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS


- (1) The Architect of the Capitol in coordination with the Capitol Police Board, implement consistent ballistic protection (Blast Resistant, Bullet Resistant and Forced-Entry Rated) for U.S. Capitol Building windows and other high risk entry points;
- (2) The Architect of the Capitol in coordination with the Capitol Police Board, implement budgeted security enhancements with a comprehensive security strategy and integration of countermeasures for the Capitol complex. Additionally, ensure that the security strategy is continuously updated and consistent with the Interagency Security Committee Standard updates and the Department of Homeland Security National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin.



INSPECTOR GENERAL

DATE: March 8, 2022

TO: J. Brett Blanton
Architect of the Capitol

FROM: Christopher P. Failla, CIG
Inspector General 

SUBJECT: Flash Report Series – U.S. Capitol Building Window Installation,
Preservation, and Repair: Before and After January 6, 2021 (2022-
0003-IE-P)

Please see the attached Flash Report for the review of the installation, preservation, and repair to the U.S. Capitol Building windows before and after January 6, 2021. This Flash Report was an independent inquiry as part of the Joint Oversight Project (2021-OIG-JT-001) announced on January 14, 2021. We found that while all windows damaged on January 6, 2021 have been repaired, there are further security enhancements and repairs needed for U.S. Capitol windows. Additionally, we found that the multi-year funds from the security supplemental to further address security enhancements at the U.S. Capitol have not yet been fully executed but are expected to be so before they expire in September 2023. This report includes two recommendations for improvements to the U.S. Capitol windows and Capitol complex security planning.

We are providing this report for your review and appropriate action. Management action should have a corrective action plan to address each of the recommendations. The Architect of the Capitol (AOC) Office of Inspector General requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. If you or AOC personnel would like to schedule a briefing to discuss this report, its findings or recommendations we are happy to accommodate and just ask that a member of your staff contact our office to coordinate. Otherwise, we will contact you within 90 days to follow-up on the progress of your management decisions related to the recommendations in this report.

I appreciate the assistance you and your staff provided throughout the assessment. Please direct questions to Chico Bennett, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations at 202.394.2391 or Chico.Bennett@aoc.gov.

Distribution List:

Valerie Hasberry, Chief Security Officer
Peter Bahm, Chief of Staff
Mary Jean Pajak, Deputy Chief of Staff
Jason Baltimore, General Counsel

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Introduction

The U.S. Capitol Building

The U.S. Capitol Building has been an iconic representation of the American people and democratic government ever since the laying of its foundational cornerstone in 1793. The U.S. Capitol has undergone several renovations and enhancements since its doors officially opened in 1800. Past damage from foreign and domestic attacks on the U.S. Capitol have been a part of the ongoing



process of improvement and efforts to update select areas of the U.S. Capitol. On January 6, 2021, rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol in an attempt to prevent the U.S. Congress from counting Electoral College votes and formalizing President Joe Biden's election. Subsequently, the Capitol complex was locked down while congressional members and their staff were evacuated or sheltered-in-place as rioters occupied and vandalized the U.S. Capitol for several hours.


There was a considerable amount of damage that resulted from the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, including damage to the U.S. Capitol and grounds, both inside and outside the building. Some of the damage inside the U.S. Capitol included damage to windows, doors, historical statues and furniture items. The world witnessed rioters breach the U.S. Capitol, in part, by breaking through the U.S. Capitol's interior and exterior doors and windows. The Capitol complex has many historic buildings that can be vulnerable to violent tactics and require a comprehensive security strategy to include threat assessments and risk management for protecting congressional members, professional staff and visitors alike. Vulnerability assessments for high risk entry points such as doors and windows are key considerations for threat based assessments. Updated threat assessments, risk management and continuous monitoring of national terrorism assessments remain a key mitigation strategy for federal buildings and infrastructure as protection against both man-made and natural hazards is a constant concern at the U.S. Capitol.

On January 14, 2021, the AOC OIG initiated a JOP examining the events that occurred at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. This project involved resources from the OIG’s Investigation, Audit, and Inspection and Evaluation divisions. The objective of the Joint Oversight Project (JOP) was to determine the effectiveness and integrity of the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC’s) security and internal policies, procedures, and practices and provide an independent evaluation of the same. The AOC Office of Inspector General (OIG) has produced a series of Flash Reports¹ examining the events that occurred adjacent to or after January 6, 2021. This Flash Report serves as an independent inquiry on the installation, preservation, and repair to the U.S. Capitol windows before and after the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. To meet the objectives of this inquiry, we asked select questions of AOC officials and the Capitol Police Board² for information pertinent to this matter. The lessons learned, and still being learned from January 6, 2021, are invaluable to how the security planning and enhancements will take shape in the days, months and years to come throughout the Capitol complex.

U.S. Capitol Window Installation Considerations

The U.S. Capitol contains over 1 million square feet, has over 600 rooms, and 658 windows of which 150 are on the first floor. The vastness of the U.S. Capitol and its day to day operation, maintenance and security requirements are shouldered by a collective of professional staff. During our review, we were told by AOC officials that the U.S. Capitol Superintendent’s office maintains the windows of the U.S. Capitol. They, in consultation with the AOC’s

Historic Preservation Officer, are the deciding authorities on the operation and maintenance of the windows. However, the Capitol Police Board is the decision authority for physical security elements, including the windows.



¹ Flash Report Series - *AOC’s Emergency Preparedness Ahead of the January 6, 2021 U.S. Capitol Event* (2021-0002-IE-P), April 27, 2021; *Independent Assessment of the AOC’s Role in Securing the Capitol Campus for Large Public Gatherings* (OIG-AUD-2021-03), May 05, 2021; *Audit of the Effects of COVID-19 and the Events of January 6 on the AOC’s Cannon House Office Building Renewal Project* (2021-AUD-010-A) – In progress.

² Capitol Police Board: AOC - member, House Sergeant at Arms – member, Senate Sergeant at Arms – member and United States Capitol Police Chief – non-voting member.

Window Infrastructure Considerations

During our review, we inquired as to what were the primary considerations and criteria for window infrastructure at the U.S. Capitol (i.e., threat assessment, structural integrity – ballistic/bullet/shatter proof, heritage preservation, window aesthetics etc.) before and after the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. AOC officials noted that threat assessments, risk and heritage preservation were and are among the primary considerations and criteria for window infrastructure. We followed up with AOC officials and asked were there any studies, other ongoing reviews or assessments for window infrastructure to which they noted there were none. AOC officials notified our office that the Capitol Police Board directed a comprehensive physical security assessment for the Capitol complex after January 6, 2021, including the U.S. Capitol, and that assessment is now complete. Our office did not review the results of the assessment at the time of our inquiry.

For security assessments of the U.S. Capitol windows, the Capitol Police Board defers to the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) while the AOC’s Historic Preservation Officer maintains the oversight for preservation related matters. On January 5, 2022, USCP Chief Tom Manger testified before the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, “*Hearing to Examine the USCP following the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol*”³ that January 6, exposed critical deficiencies with operational planning, intelligence, staffing, and equipment within the USCP. Our inquiry focused on general considerations for window infrastructure at the U.S. Capitol and not on the USCP threat assessment process. We did not make any determinations with regard to the USCP threat assessment process or risk management decisions. However, we do note that the Interagency Security Committee (ISC)⁴ highlights the importance of a risk management process and states that the risk management process begins by outlining the approach necessary to identify, assess and prioritize the risks to federal facilities.

Threat Assessment and Risk Management

The risk management process provides the method for determining the facility security level based on the characteristics of each facility and the federal occupant(s) who inhabit that facility.⁵ Additionally, the ISC notes that consideration must be given to the risk from more common criminal acts, such as theft, assault, violent civil disturbances, workplace violence and vandalism—acts that historically occur more frequently at federal facilities than acts of terrorism. The Homeland Security Threat Assessment released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in October 2020, assessed that some U.S.-based violent extremists were capitalizing on increased

³ [HTTPS://WWW.RULES.SENATE.GOV/HEARINGS/OVERSIGHT-OF-THE-US-CAPITOL-POLICE-FOLLOWING-THE-JANUARY-6TH-ATTACK-ON-THE-CAPITOL-PART-III](https://www.rules.senate.gov/hearings/oversight-of-the-us-capitol-police-following-the-january-6th-attack-on-the-capitol-part-iii)


⁴ Interagency Security Committee - chaired by the Department of Homeland Security, consists of 64 departments and agencies and has a mission to develop security policies, standards, and recommendations for nonmilitary federal facilities in the United States.

⁵ The Risk Management Process: An Interagency Security Committee Standard; 2021 Edition, p.10.

social and political tensions in 2020, which would drive an elevated threat environment at least through early 2021. The assessment noted that violent extremists would continue to target individuals or institutions that represent symbols of their grievances, as well as grievances based on political affiliation or perceived policy positions.⁶ The assessment further noted that anti-government and/or anti-authority violent extremists were likely to be emboldened by a perceived success exploiting otherwise peaceful protest movements and concealing violent tactics.⁷ These violent extremists have increasingly taken advantage of large protest crowds to conduct violence against government officials, facilities, and counter-protestors. The incident at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, became the violent flash point event as assessed by DHS in 2020, and illustrates the importance of continuous monitoring of national threat assessments and intelligence reports.

U.S. Capitol Window Budget and post January 6, 2021 Repair

On January 6, 2021, media captured rioters breaching the U.S. Capitol, in part, by breaking through some of the building windows. U.S. lawmakers continue to examine the events that occurred at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, and have appropriated funds over the past year to start the recovery process from those events. On February 24, 2021, the Architect of the



Capitol Mr. J. Brett Blanton testified before the House Committee on Appropriations Legislative Branch Subcommittee, “*Hearing on Health and Wellness of Employees and State of Damage and Preservation as a Result of January 6, 2021*”⁸ that the AOC received approval from the Committee to transfer \$30 million from other projects to address critical security areas such as fencing around the Capitol complex and damage repair in the initial aftermath of the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Mr. Blanton also testified that in the Capitol complex, the initial assessment was that most of the damage was in areas maintained by the AOC – on the interior and envelope of the building with broken glass, broken doors, graffiti and damage to historical statues, murals and furniture. The AOC Chief Financial Officer (CFO) noted that the AOC received an additional transfer authorization, for \$10

⁶ DHS Homeland Security Threat Assessment: October 2020, p.17

⁷ DHS Homeland Security Threat Assessment: October 2020, p.18.

⁸ [HTTPS://APPROPRIATIONS.HOUSE.GOV/EVENTS/HEARINGS/HEALTH-AND-WELLNESS-OF-EMPLOYEES-AND-STATE-OF-DAMAGE-AND-PRESERVATION-AS-A-RESULT-OF](https://appropriations.house.gov/events/hearings/health-and-wellness-of-employees-and-state-of-damage-and-preservation-as-a-result-of)

million. The \$30 million and \$10 million were transferred from a Library Building and Grounds offsite project at Fort Meade, Maryland, and have not been restored to date but should be part of the future AOC budget request. Our office did not receive an expenditure report for the \$40 million, however, the CFO noted that a good majority of the funds were used in support of immediate security areas such as fencing around the Capitol complex.

Budget Planning

During our review, we asked the AOC for the U.S. Capitol window budget plan and expenditure report with regard to repair and improvement before and after January 6, 2021. In response to our inquiry, AOC officials told us that the U.S. Capitol budget needs were determined and prioritized based on various inputs and considerations (e.g., facility assessments, client requests, etc.). The AOC's Capitol Building jurisdiction requested and received annual funds totaling \$27,371,000 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 and did not report any funding shortfalls for FY 2020 maintenance and operations. However, the AOC Deferred Maintenance List included U.S. Capitol windows that required repair, which were prioritized based on window condition. We were told by AOC officials that the condition of many of the wood windows necessitated repairs to prevent water intrusion, and that more repairs and upgrades were necessary. Yet, the AOC FY 2020 budget as provided to our office did not specify nor detail any particular security enhancements for the U.S. Capitol windows. After review of the U.S. Capitol budget as provided, our office did not make any immediate determinations with regard to the planning efforts on behalf of the AOC in their prioritization of windows on the Deferred Maintenance List. However, as rioters were able to breach the U.S. Capitol including ground-floor windows and glass-paned doors, the AOC OIG Audit Division has announced an independent assessment of the AOC's Progress on the Backlog of Security-related Deferred Maintenance Projects Subsequent to the Events of January 6, 2021.

Repair and Improvement

We asked AOC officials if all the windows at the U.S. Capitol damaged on January 6, 2021, had been repaired or improved. We were told by AOC officials that only windows damaged on January 6, 2021, have been repaired and that further improvements were pending. AOC officials stated that \$242,000 was spent in the January 6, 2021, aftermath to install and remove plywood and then repair damaged windows. AOC officials noted that on the night of January 6, 2021, the USCP alerted the AOC of broken windows that required plywood to secure prior to allowing reentry of the building. On the morning of January 7, 2021, teams of AOC employees walked the U.S. Capitol to identify damage that included damaged windows. These teams identified damaged windows and a contractor subsequently completed necessary repairs. Several windows required hazardous material removal that was performed by AOC employees prior to the contractor replacing the broken glass. In

the months following the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the AOC received \$283 million in the security supplemental to address security related upgrades for windows and doors in the U.S. Capitol. However, as of publication of this report, the multi-year funds from the security supplemental have not been fully executed though the AOC plans to do so before funds expire in September 2023.

On January 11, 2022, Mr. Blanton testified before the House Committee on Appropriations Legislative Branch Subcommittee, “*Security of the Capitol Campus since the Attack of January 6, 2021*,”⁹ where he noted that further improvements to the U.S. Capitol windows are under design, and scheduled to be installed in the spring of 2022. During our review, we were not made aware of any countermeasures to mitigate the spectrum of threats while the windows are being fabricated. We asked AOC officials in light of the insurrection activities at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, what considerations would be given to the U.S. Capitol window infrastructure (i.e., structural integrity – ballistic/bullet/shatter proof, heritage preservation, window aesthetics etc.). We were told that the Capitol Police Board considered multiple factors in its assessment of the windows in the U.S. Capitol, including threat and required protective standards. Although, the aforementioned threat assessment and required protective standards were not disclosed to our office during our review. AOC officials also noted that security enhancement ballistic ratings will be based on the threat and the assets being protected. The ratings will not be made public or disclosed in order to maintain the effectiveness of the chosen standard.

After September 11, 2001, the U.S. Capitol, along with other federal buildings across Washington D.C, were upgraded with bomb-resistant windows and other protective security enhancements. AOC and other historical records reflect the large-scale projects and publicized renovations over various periods of time at the U.S. Capitol and other federal buildings in Washington D.C.¹⁰ In 2017 there were upgrades planned for the Capitol complex in the wake of a series of high-profile threats including a visitor brandishing a firearm at the U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, a protester crashing a gyrocopter on the West Front Lawn of the U.S. Capitol,¹¹ and consistent threats made against congressional members.¹² Some of the planned security enhancements at that time included a plan to install reinforced windows, safety and security film on windows, additional security cameras and motion sensors on the U.S. Capitol lawn and other areas. During our review, we asked AOC officials and the

⁹ [HTTPS://APPROPRIATIONS.HOUSE.GOV/EVENTS/HEARINGS/SECURITY-OF-THE-CAPITOL-CAMPUS-SINCE-THE-ATTACK-OF-JANUARY-6-2021](https://appropriations.house.gov/events/hearings/security-of-the-capitol-campus-since-the-attack-of-january-6-2021)

¹⁰

[HTTPS://WWW.GOVINFO.GOV/CONTENT/PKG/CHRG;HTTPS://WWW.DHS.GOV/XLIBRARY/ASSETS/ST/ST-BIPS](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG;https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips)

¹¹ Scott McFarlane, February 15, 2017, “U.S. Capitol Plans Security Upgrades After Recent Threats” News4, Washington.

¹² Peterson and Manning (2017). Violence Against Members of Congress and Their Staff: Selected Examples and Congressional Responses (Report No. R41609). Congressional Research Service. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41609.pdf>; Christina Marcos March 3, 2021, “Threats to lawmakers up 93.5 percent in last two months,” The Hill.

Capitol Police Board about these security countermeasures. They did not disclose this information or identify which windows at the U.S. Capitol were reinforced and to what level they were reinforced before the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.

Industry experts on threat resistance note that ballistic protection in buildings such as window glazing, blast resistant, bullet resistant, forced-entry rated and other components are a key part of integrated countermeasures, and thus are essential elements of design for threat mitigation and threat protection. Industry experts also note that as security threats continue to escalate around the U.S., demand for greater threat resistance in buildings increases at the same rate. Moreover, after a comprehensive threat assessment and risk analysis, appropriate countermeasures should be implemented to protect people, assets and day to day operations.

Conclusion

The U.S. Capitol is the meeting place of the nation's legislature, a place of historical representation and an open complex for the public. There is a continuous and persistent threat environment in and around the Capitol complex. The DHS National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin¹³ notes that while the conditions underlying the heightened threat landscape have not significantly changed over the last year, the convergence of the following factors has increased the volatility, unpredictability and complexity of the threat environment: (1) the proliferation of false or misleading narratives, which sow discord or undermine public trust in U.S. government institutions; and (2) continued calls for violence directed at U.S. critical infrastructure; soft targets and mass gatherings. Updated threat and risk management assessments linked with the other federal, state and local law enforcement intelligence is a key component in mitigating those associated threats against the Capitol complex. Moreover, the budgeted security enhancements for repair and improvements after the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, must also be aligned with a comprehensive security strategy and integrated countermeasures. Implementation of a comprehensive security strategy and integrated countermeasures will help reduce exposure and protect the Capitol complex, congressional members, staff, visitors and assets from unauthorized persons and violent activities.

This Flash Report serves as an independent inquiry on the installation, preservation, and repair to the U.S. Capitol windows before and after the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. This report is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive report but rather provide information on select areas of interest. We provide two recommendations from this review and as our JOP work continues, we will follow up on additional information and complaints as received. The AOC OIG Audit Division has announced an independent assessment of the AOC's Progress on the Backlog of Security-related Deferred Maintenance Projects Subsequent to the Events of January

¹³ DHS National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin- Issued: February 07, 2022; Expires: June 7, 2022.

6, 2021. Additionally, our office will follow up with the AOC to review updated budget execution reports over the next year for the \$283 million supplemental funding received to [REDACTED] and enhance physical security. The lessons learned, and still being learned from January 6, 2021, are invaluable to how the security planning efforts and enhancements will take shape in the coming days, months and years across the Capitol complex.

Recommendations:

- (1) The Architect of the Capitol in coordination with the Capitol Police Board, implement consistent ballistic protection (Blast Resistant, Bullet Resistant and Forced-Entry Rated) for U.S. Capitol windows and other high risk entry points.
- (2) The Architect of the Capitol in coordination with the Capitol Police Board, implement budgeted security enhancements with a comprehensive security strategy and integration of countermeasures for the Capitol complex. Additionally, ensure that the security strategy is continuously updated and consistent with the Interagency Security Committee Standard updates and the Department of Homeland Security National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOC	Architect of the Capitol
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FY	Fiscal Year
IG	Inspector General
ISC	Interagency Security Committee
JOP	Joint Oversight Project
OIG	Office of Inspector General
U.S.	United States
USCP	U.S. Capitol Police



OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Fairchild Building, Suite 518
499 South Capitol Street, SW
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 593-1948
hotline@aoc-oig.org