


CUI

# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

MAY 17, 2024



## (U) Audit of the DoD's Controls for Validating and Responding to Ukraine's Requests for Military Equipment and Assistance

~~Controlled by: DoD-OIG~~  
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INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

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# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Audit of the DoD's Controls for Validating and Responding to Ukraine's Requests for Military Equipment and Assistance*

May 17, 2024

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine the extent to which the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) implemented controls for validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance and coordinated with partner nations.\* Specifically, we focused on the DoD military equipment and assistance provided to Ukraine from existing stocks through Presidential Drawdown Authority.

### (U) Background

(U) The use of the Presidential Drawdown Authority to provide military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act allows for delivery of military equipment and assistance from DoD stocks to foreign countries to respond to unforeseen emergencies. As of March 12, 2024, the DoD announced 55 Presidential Drawdowns, totaling \$26.2 billion, for military equipment and assistance for Ukraine. Military assistance to Ukraine has included weapon systems, ammunition, support equipment, and spare parts. In addition, assistance has included funding for training the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and maintaining and sustaining equipment.

(U) The process to approve a Presidential Drawdown lasts approximately 2 weeks and some key processes involve the identification of a list of requested military equipment and assistance from direct communication with the UAF, validating Ukraine's requests, and identifying quantities that the Military Services can provide.

\* (U) We anticipate doing additional work to examine the DoD's process for sourcing equipment after validation and coordination has occurred.

### (U) Findings

(U) The USEUCOM, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), and Service Component Commands (SCCs) had controls in place, and they continued to update controls to validate Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance required to fill capability gaps. USEUCOM established the Future Forces Ukraine Working Group to review Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance, and SAG-U and the SCCs established various Command-unique controls for validating Ukraine's requests. However, USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs did not document the roles, responsibilities, processes, or procedures for validating Ukraine requests. According to USEUCOM, SAG-U, and SCC officials, they did not document processes and procedures because of the fast-paced nature of the effort and sense of urgency to support the UAF.

(U) As a result, although USEUCOM, SAG-U, and SCC officials communicated and coordinated to support UAF requests for military equipment and assistance, officials did not ensure seamless operations for the validation process of Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance. Documenting processes and procedures is critical due to the rate of rotation of personnel supporting the Ukraine security assistance efforts.

(U) Also, although the DoD coordinated at multiple levels on Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance with partner nations, there were challenges that made coordination with partner nations difficult. For example, DoD officials identified challenges with the:

- (U) large number of partner nations donating military equipment to Ukraine,
- (U) classification levels of information, and
- (U) partner nations wishing to remain discrete donors.



# (U) Results in Brief

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## *(U) Audit of the DoD's Controls for Validating and Responding to Ukraine's Requests for Military Equipment and Assistance*

### **(U) Findings (cont'd)**

(U) Partner nation coordination is vital for effective support of Ukraine's requests for military equipment. Although the DoD coordinated at the Office of the Secretary of Defense strategic level and at the SAG-U and International Donor Coordination Center tactical level, the challenges referenced above impacted the ability to achieve such effective coordination.

### **(U) Recommendations**

(U) We recommend the USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with SAG-U and its SCCs, document roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures for validating the Ukraine requests for military equipment and assistance. We also recommend the USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with the SAG-U Commander, identify and implement courses of action to mitigate coordination challenges with partner nations regarding the classification level of information.

### **(U) Management Comments and Our Response**

(U) We provided the draft report on March 4, 2024, and requested written comments on the recommendations by April 3, 2024. However, the USEUCOM Commander did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. We request that the Commander provide comments within 30 days in response to the final report to address the recommendations. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page.

**(U) Recommendations Table**

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
(U) Commander, U.S. European Command	A.1 and B.1	None	None (U)

(U) Please provide Management Comments by June 16, 2024.

**(U) Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 17, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of the DoD's Controls for Validating and Responding to Ukraine's Requests for Military Equipment and Assistance (Report No. DODIG-2024-082)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the Commander, U.S. European Command, did not provide a response to the report.

(U) Therefore, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until management has agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendations and management officials submit adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [audrigo@dodig.mil](mailto:audrigo@dodig.mil) if unclassified or [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Vasquez".

Richard B. Vasquez  
Assistant Inspector General for Audit  
Readiness and Global Operations

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## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

## (U) Introduction

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### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine the extent to which the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) had controls in place for validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance and coordinated with partner nations.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, we focused on the DoD military equipment and assistance provided to Ukraine from existing stocks through Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA).

### (U) Background

#### ***(U) Presidential Drawdown Authority***

(U) The use of the PDA to provide military assistance under section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act is an authority of U.S. foreign policy in crisis situations.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Assistance Act allows for delivery of military equipment and assistance from DoD stocks to foreign countries to respond to unforeseen emergencies.

#### ***(U) DoD Military Equipment and Assistance Provided Through PDA***

(U) As of March 12, 2024, the DoD announced 55 Presidential Drawdowns (PD), totaling \$26.2 billion, for military equipment and assistance for Ukraine. Military assistance to Ukraine has included weapon systems, ammunition, support equipment, and spare parts. In addition, assistance has included funding for training the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and maintaining and sustaining equipment. For example, PD 30 was announced on January 19, 2023, and it authorized \$2.5 billion of military assistance to Ukraine and included hundreds of armored vehicles, critical support for Ukraine's air defense, and other capabilities. PD 30 included 59 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles,

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<sup>1</sup> (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

(U) For the purpose of the audit, we considered validating a request to include a DoD source verifying that the capability or equipment requested by Ukraine was needed in order to defend itself against Russian aggression. We anticipate doing additional work to examine the DoD's processes for sourcing equipment after validation and coordination has occurred.

<sup>2</sup> (U) Public Law 87-195, "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961," September 4, 1961.

(U) 8 Avenger air defense systems, 95,000 105-mm artillery rounds, and various spare parts.<sup>3</sup> Figure 1 shows U.S. Transportation Command processing Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles for delivery to Ukraine and the Avenger air defense system.



(U) Figure 1. Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (Left) and Avenger Air Defense System (Right)  
(U) Source: U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Army.

### **(U) Presidential Drawdown Process for Providing Military Equipment and Assistance to Ukraine**

(~~CUI~~) Determining the specific military equipment and associated quantities to provide is a deliberate process with many inputs from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD[P]), Military Services, USEUCOM, Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U), [REDACTED], International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC), and other representatives. The process to approve a PD took approximately 2 weeks and some key processes involve the identification of a list of requested military equipment and assistance from direct communication with the UAF, validating Ukraine’s requests, and identifying quantities that the Military Services can provide.

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

<sup>3</sup> (U) See Appendix B for the complete list of equipment the DoD announced as part of PD 30.

(U) Figure 2. Key Stakeholders in the Presidential Drawdown Requirements Review Process



(U) LEGEND

- (CUI) [Redacted]

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Our audit focused on the generation of Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance and USEUCOM’s controls for validating and approving the requests for submission to the Office of the Secretary of Defense level. However, we did not audit controls at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level after the submission of requirements.

## ***(U) Roles and Responsibilities for the Presidential Drawdown Process in the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility***

### ***(U) U.S. European Command***

(U) USEUCOM is one of 11 combatant commands of the U.S. military and is responsible for U.S. military operations across Europe. Within USEUCOM, the J5 directorate is responsible for plans, policy, strategy, and capabilities and is responsible to the USEUCOM Commander for formulating and executing military strategy and policy, planning, and coordinating security cooperation for command activities involving other U.S. Unified Commands, allied and partner military organizations, and subordinate commands. In this capacity, the J5 directorate prepares UAF security assistance recommendations for the USEUCOM Commander to approve and forward to the OUSD(P).

~~(CUI)~~ USEUCOM's ██████████ coordinates with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces to provide military equipment, training, and educational opportunities to support Ukraine's military. ██████████ receives, reviews, and forwards Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance to the USEUCOM J5 directorate or USEUCOM's Service Component Commands (SCCs).

### ***(U) USEUCOM Service Component Commands***

(U) USEUCOM has SCCs that include U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF), U.S. Naval Forces Europe–Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF), U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA), U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, and U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR).

(U) NAVEUR-NAVAF, USAFE-AFAFRICA, and SOCEUR receive requests from Ukrainian counterparts, and officials determine whether the Service can provide the requested, or similar, capability and submit the request and recommended quantity to the USEUCOM J5 directorate for discussion and consideration as a recommendation to the Office of the Secretary of Defense–led, Cross–Department Working Group. USAREUR-AF and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa are also involved in the PD process but were not generating recommendations.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> (U) USAREUR-AF officials stated that SAG-U received Ukraine's requests and developed recommendations and that USAREUR-AF reviewed and supported SAG-U's recommendations. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa official stated that because the Ukrainian Marines were under the operational command of the Ukrainian land forces, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa were not receiving Ukraine's requests, but the SCC coordinated with USEUCOM to provide input on capabilities.

***(U) Security Assistance Group-Ukraine***

(U) On November 4, 2022, the DoD announced the establishment of SAG-U. SAG-U is a dedicated headquarters element in Wiesbaden, Germany, established to execute the full range of U.S. security assistance activities in support of Ukraine operations. SAG-U’s mission is to support security assistance activities, coordinate training efforts, oversee efforts to supply and equip the UAF, and enhance Ukraine’s situational awareness as part of the DoD’s long-term commitment to Ukraine alongside U.S. allies and partners. In addition, in April 2023, SAG-U created a formal review board to validate UAF requests and submit military equipment and assistance requirements for Ukraine to the USEUCOM J5 directorate for consideration.

***(U) International Donor Coordination Center***

(U) The IDCC is a United Kingdom-led, multinational organization co-located with SAG-U, where personnel from 20 different countries accept and coordinate donations for Ukraine from more than 50 donating nations. According to IDCC officials, U.S. and partner nation military officers review the Korovai system for UAF requests and enter their donations.<sup>5</sup> In addition, UAF liaisons located in the IDCC provide the IDCC with priority requests daily and feedback on the utility of the security assistance provided. Figure 3 shows IDCC staff from the United States and United Kingdom coordinating security assistance efforts to Ukraine.



(U) Figure 3. IDCC Staff from the United States and United Kingdom Coordinating Security Assistance  
(U) Source: Defense Visual Information Distribution Service.

<sup>5</sup> (CUI) [REDACTED]

***(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy***

~~(CUI)~~ The OUSD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on security assistance matters. In this role, the OUSD(P) supports Secretary of Defense security goals, policies, and priorities to help shape national security objectives and enable greater unity of effort. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> (U) O-6, 2-star, and 4-star refers to the military rank (and equivalent civilian rank) of officials represented in each of the Cross-Department Working Groups. Requests for military equipment and assistance received by the OUSD(P) begin at the O-6 level working group, and if approved, proceed through the 2-Star and 4-Star level working groups for consideration. Our audit did not focus on the OUSD(P) Cross-Department Working Group level.

## (U) Finding A

### (U) USEUCOM and Its Service Component Commands Have Controls for Validating Ukraine Requests for Military Equipment and Assistance, but Improvements Are Needed

(U) USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs had controls in place, and they continued to update controls to validate Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance required to fill capability gaps.<sup>7</sup> For example, USEUCOM established the Future Forces Ukraine Working Group (FFWG) to review Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance, and SAG-U and USEUCOM's SCCs established various command-unique controls for validating Ukraine's requests.

(U) However, USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs did not document the roles, responsibilities, processes, or procedures for validating Ukraine's requests. According to USEUCOM, SAG-U, and SCC officials, they did not document processes or procedures because of the fast-paced nature of the effort and sense of urgency to support the UAF.

(U) As a result, although USEUCOM, SAG-U, and SCC officials communicated and coordinated to support UAF requests for military equipment and assistance, officials did not ensure seamless operations for validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance. Documenting processes and procedures is critical due to the current rate of rotation of personnel supporting the Ukraine security assistance efforts.

### (U) Controls in Place for Validating Ukraine's Requests

~~(CUI)~~ USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs had controls in place, and they continued to update controls to validate Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance required to fill capability gaps. For example, ██████████ the SCCs, and SAG-U established various command-unique controls for validating requests, and USEUCOM established the FFWG. Key stakeholders in USEUCOM collectively review and discuss the PD Requirements at the FFWG (see Figure 2). USEUCOM Instruction 7101.01 states that internal controls will be maintained or established and should provide continuous feedback to management regarding the integrity of any operational process.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> (U) For the report, USEUCOM Service Component Commands are referred to as SCCs.

<sup>8</sup> (U) USEUCOM Instruction 7101.01, "Managers' Internal Control Program," January 7, 2011.

**(CUI) [REDACTED] Established Controls**

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**(U) Service Component Commands Established Controls**

(U) SCC officials established controls to validate Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance. For example, NAVEUR-NAVAF, USAFE-AFAFRICA, and SOCEUR coordinated with Ukrainian counterparts and established internal processes to validate Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance.

***(U) Coordination with Ukrainian Counterparts***

~~(CUI)~~ Through coordination with Ukrainian military peer counterparts, the SCCs identified potential requirements for military equipment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These discussions resulted in potential requirements for military equipment that the SCCs submitted as recommendations for discussion at the FFWG.

***(U) Internal Processes to Validate Ukraine Requests***

(U) The SCCs developed processes to validate the need for a capability and proposed quantity. For example, SOCEUR established an adjudication board and documented their internal process. According to SOCEUR officials, the adjudication board reviewed each recommendation regarding quantity, cost, capability, and determined the best military equipment to provide, if any, to the UAF. In addition, because of continued turnover and attrition of personnel, SOCEUR officials informed us that they documented some of their internal processes and templates on the development of recommendations for military equipment presented to the FFWG. For example, SOCEUR developed templates for how to fill out a recommendation slide for the FFWG, which included all the data needed by the USEUCOM J5 officials to present at the FFWG meeting.

(U) According to USAFE-AFAFRICA and NAVEUR-NAVAF officials, their respective commanders reviewed recommendations for military equipment before forwarding recommendations to the FFWG. For example, in May 2023, USAFE-AFAFRICA documented their internal processes that:

- (U) identified how USAFE-AFAFRICA obtained requests for military equipment,
- (U) constructively discussed requests, including platforms that could provide the desired capabilities, through tactical subject matter experts,
- (U) identified required quantities, and
- (U) identified the best military equipment to meet Ukraine’s requests.

(U) In addition, according to USAFE-AFAPRICA officials, once the military equipment need was identified, the USAFE-AFAPRICA Commander reviewed and approved it before USAFE-AFAPRICA provided the recommendations to the FFWG.

### ***(U) Security Assistance Group–Ukraine Established Controls***

(U) SAG-U officials established controls to validate Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance. For example, SAG-U officials coordinated requests with Ukrainian officials and partner nation liaison officers, hosted a training and logistics conference to identify capability gaps, and implemented a comprehensive battle rhythm to synchronize efforts within the Command.<sup>9</sup>

### ***(U) Coordination with Ukrainian Officials and Partner Nations***

(CUI) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For example, SAG-U officials stated that they identified and received requests for military equipment through daily interactions and discussions with Ukraine liaison officers. SAG-U officials also stated that they did not approve every request they received. For example, officials stated that they first verified that military equipment was requested by the UAF in Korovai. Next, officials gathered any additional information needed to present the capability and quantity at the other internal meetings, such as the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB), discussed in the following section.

(U) According to SAG-U officials, in addition to daily interactions and discussions with Ukraine liaison officers, SAG-U participated in training and logistics conferences, coordinating with partner nations on how to address identified capability gaps. For example, during the logistics conferences DoD officials and partner nations discussed the desired combat power build of the UAF, shortfalls and gaps for the UAF, international equipment donations, and the synchronized sustainment and movement of the equipment. Although SAG-U had controls to coordinate requests with Ukrainian officials and partner nations, several challenges made coordination with partner nations difficult. For more information regarding the training and logistics conferences, see Finding B.

<sup>9</sup> (U) The DoD defines battle rhythm as a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.

***(U) Battle Rhythm for Key Processes***

~~(CUI)~~ SAG-U implemented and documented a repeatable battle rhythm to identify, coordinate, and execute critical activities supporting Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance. SAG-U’s battle rhythm consisted of nearly 50 recurring meetings each month that informed SAG-U leadership of the UAF’s military equipment and assistance needs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In April 2023, SAG-U added the JARB as part of the battle rhythm. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although SAG-U did not initially implement a review board, it established the JARB in April 2023 to validate the need for capabilities and quantities proposed for inclusion in PDs. Before this initial review board, the DoD approved 10 PDs, totaling \$8.6 billion.<sup>10</sup>

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]

<sup>10</sup> (U) The DoD approved 34 PD drawdowns, totaling \$19.51 billion from August 2021 through March 2023 before SAG-U established a review board. Of the 34 drawdowns, 10 were approved between the time the DoD established SAG-U and SAG-U established a review board (November 2022 to March 2023).

### **(U) USEUCOM's Future Forces Ukraine Working Group**

~~(CUI)~~ USEUCOM J5 chairs the FFWG that was established in August 2022. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The FFWG stakeholders discuss UAF requests for military equipment, the capabilities the FFWG participants believe the DoD should provide, and makes recommendations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cross-Department Working Groups. FFWG participants discuss and prioritize Ukraine's requests for military equipment, assistance for USEUCOM approval, and recommendations for potential inclusion in future PDs.

(U) The FFWG meets every week to review Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance. To assist the FFWG with identifying and recommending the most critical military equipment and assistance for potential PD, the FFWG uses a capability prioritization list of the UAF's top 10 desired capabilities developed collaboratively with OUSD(P).

### **(U) USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs Lacked Documented Roles, Responsibilities, Processes, or Procedures for Ukraine Requests**

~~(CUI)~~ USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs did not document key roles, responsibilities, processes, or procedures for validating Ukraine requests. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, they could not provide official, documented policies or procedures for how the recommendations should be prepared and justified prior to submittal for approval.

(U) USEUCOM Instruction 6001.01A states that USEUCOM directors and special staff chiefs will develop local knowledge management guidelines to gather, collect, and document the knowledge of personnel within the organization.<sup>11</sup> The instruction also encourages subordinate organizations to align their respective knowledge management programs to USEUCOM's approach.

(U) According to Government Accountability Office standards, some level of documentation is necessary so that the components of internal control can be designed, implemented, and operated effectively.<sup>12</sup> An organization will best achieve its objectives by implementing controls through policies in a sufficient level of detail to allow management to effectively monitor the control activity and should include the responsibilities for the objectives of the operational process and the procedures to accomplish the task.

<sup>11</sup> (U) U.S. European Command Instruction 6001.01A, "United States European Command Knowledge Management Program," March 13, 2018.

<sup>12</sup> (U) GAO-14-704G, "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government," September 2014.

### ***(U) Actions Taken to Document Roles, Responsibilities, Processes, and Procedures for Ukraine Requests***

(U) Although USEUCOM, SAG-U, and SCC officials did not document roles, responsibilities, processes, or procedures for validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance, during our audit SAG-U officials acknowledged the importance of documenting key controls and initiated actions to identify and document controls. For example, SAG-U established a Knowledge Management program in April 2023 to develop effective staff processes and procedures and achieve a shared organizational understanding that enables decision support for the commander.

(U) As of July 2023, SAG-U recognized that their knowledge management capabilities reflected an organization that may be managing processes but had not yet standardized or documented them. SAG-U specifically recognized the need to identify and document staff processes and work with process owners to create process flow charts. SAG-U's goal was to develop processes that were well documented, standardized across the organization, and could be found in a central repository that allowed for improved communication between staff and leadership. According to SAG-U officials, SAG-U was working to document key processes and procedures across the organization, including the processes and procedures for validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance.

(U) Documented roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures should help ensure that USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs are operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, documenting the approval process, including internal controls should ensure a seamless transition when personnel rotate from positions and allow the commands to share knowledge with other DoD stakeholders currently involved in security assistance to support Ukraine. Furthermore, documented processes and procedures that incorporate lessons learned could serve as a basis for executing PDs of military equipment and assistance at other combatant commands. The USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with SAG-U and its SCCs, should document roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures for validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance.

### ***(U) Supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces War Efforts Delayed Timely Documentation of Controls***

(U) USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs did not document processes or procedures because, according to officials we interviewed, there was a sense of urgency and the nature of the efforts to support the UAF was fast-paced. For example, SAG-U officials stated that the high operations tempo and urgency of getting Ukraine military equipment and assistance delayed documenting roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures.

(U) The United States is the world's leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine and is completing deliveries daily to support Ukraine's defense against the Russian invading forces. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is also rapidly evolving, requiring constant efforts to fulfill priority requests, coordinate deliveries, and synchronize efforts.

## **(U) Documented Roles, Responsibilities, Processes, and Procedures Needed for Efficient Operations**

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]

(U) Identifying, institutionalizing, and operationalizing processes and procedures allows for continuous operations when personnel rotate. In addition, the knowledge and lessons learned regarding the validation of military assistance requests from Ukraine could benefit other combatant commands and DoD Components now and in the future.

## **(U) Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***(U) Recommendation A.1***

**(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. European Command, in coordination with Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and its Service Component Commands, document roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures for validating the Ukraine requests for military equipment and assistance.**

### ***(U) Management Comments Required***

(U) We provided the draft report on March 4, 2024, and requested written comments on the recommendations by April 3, 2024. However, the Commander, U.S. European Command, did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. We request that the Commander provide comments within 30 days of the final report.

## **(U) Finding B**

### **(U) Although the DoD Coordinated Ukraine's Requests with Partner Nations, Challenges Existed**

(U) The DoD coordinated at multiple levels on Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance with partner nations. For example, the OUSD(P) established the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), and SAG-U participated in training and logistics conferences and participated on the IDCC to coordinate with partner nations. Although the DoD coordinated at multiple levels on Ukraine's requests, there were challenges that made coordination with partner nations difficult. For example, DoD officials identified challenges with the:

- (U) large number of partner nations donating military equipment to Ukraine,
- (U) classification levels of information, and
- (U) partner nations wishing to remain discrete donors.

(U) Effective partner nation coordination is vital for seamless support of Ukraine's requests for military equipment. Although the DoD coordinated at the Office of the Secretary of Defense strategic level and at the SAG-U and IDCC tactical level, challenges related to the sharing of information impacted effective coordination.

### **(U) Partner Nation Coordination**

(U) The U.S. Secretary of Defense established the UDCG to encourage and synchronize partner nation donations and capability gaps, and SAG-U participated in training and logistics conferences and the IDCC to coordinate with partner nations regarding Ukraine requests for military equipment and assistance. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are a centerpiece of the 2022 National Defense Strategy and are recognized as the DoD's greatest global strategic advantage.

## ***(U) The Secretary of Defense Established the Ukraine Defense Contact Group***

(U) The U.S. Secretary of Defense chairs the UDCG that held its first meeting on April 26, 2022. The Secretary's goal for the UDCG was to facilitate a common understanding of Ukraine's evolving requirements and discuss the prioritization and logistics of providing aid. During these meetings, the Ukrainian Defense Minister briefed the contact group members on the situation in Ukraine, critical capability gaps that Ukraine is facing, and requirements that Ukraine needs in the future. As of June 2023, 53 countries have attended the UDCG meetings and provided more than \$27 billion in direct security assistance commitments to Ukraine.

~~(U)~~ The group of nations has delivered the majority of air defense systems and armored vehicles, provided large quantities of ammunition, and trained thousands of Ukrainian service members on these capabilities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Specifically, the UDCG's coordination efforts resulted in partner nations donating more than 230 tanks and 2,000 armored vehicles to support at least nine UAF armored brigades. Figure 4 shows the 11th UDCG meeting that was held at Ramstein Air Base, Germany on April 21, 2023, and included nearly 50 nations from around the world.



**(U) SAG-U Hosted Training and Logistics Conferences to Identify Capability Gaps**

~~(CUI)~~ SAG-U hosted training and logistics conferences with partner nations. For example, SAG-U held a Joint Training Conference from January 30, 2023, through February 1, 2023. The conference included partner nations, and discussions focused on the synchronization of training opportunities related to the UAF’s desired delivery of combat power. In addition, SAG-U held a Joint Logistics conference, which included partner nations, from February 1, 2023, through February 3, 2023. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] The conferences provided an opportunity for real-time candid conversations between partner nations and expedited a collaborative response to addressing anticipated UAF deficiencies.

**(U) SAG-U Integrated with the IDCC**

(U) While coalition partners took the lead in the IDCC to identify Ukraine’s requests, SAG-U officials actively participated and coordinated with coalition partners in the IDCC. For example, SAG-U officials stated that they coordinated with coalition liaison officers from partner nations to understand Ukraine’s capability gaps and requests. SAG-U officials also stated that the IDCC coordinated with partner nations to identify capabilities that partner nations could provide in response to Ukraine’s requests. Additionally, SAG-U officials stated that they had daily communication with IDCC officials and worked with liaison officers from coalition partners to better understand partner capabilities and Ukraine’s requests.

Figure 5 shows U.S. and partner nation leadership within the IDCC as of May 2023.

(U) Figure 5. International Donor Coordination Center Organizational Chart



(U) LEGEND

(U) CJ Combined Joint

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(U) USA United States of America

(U) Source: The SAG-U.

### (U) Challenges with Partner Nation Coordination

(U) Although the DoD coordinated with partner nations at multiple levels on Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance, there were challenges that made coordination complicated. For example, DoD officials identified the following challenges.

- **(U) Large Number of Partner Nations Donating Military Equipment to Ukraine.** With more than 50 partner nations participating in the UDCG and many providing donations, the DoD must communicate with each potential donor country to better understand overall donation types and quantities to determine overall capabilities and identify capability gaps. Therefore, seamless communication and coordination regarding donations could be complicated.

- ~~(CUI)~~ **Classification Levels of Information.** The classification level of information creates a challenge for the DoD when coordinating donations with partner nations. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Therefore, seamless coordination regarding donations with partner nations is complicated.
- **(U) Discrete Donors.** A number of partner nations wish to remain anonymous or prefer one-on-one communications regarding donations; therefore, further complicating DoD coordination with partner nations.

(U) Despite the aforementioned challenges, the DoD continued to build and deepen coordination with partner nations in support of Ukraine and European security. Although the DoD continued to coordinate with partner nations at multiple levels on Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance, the USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with SAG-U, should identify and implement courses of action to mitigate coordination challenges with partner nations regarding the classification level of information.

**(U) Continued Coordination**

(U) Effective partner nation coordination is vital for effective support of Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance. Although the DoD coordinated at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense strategic level and at the SAG-U and IDCC operational and tactical levels, challenges impacted effective coordination as stated. Therefore, DoD officials must continue exercising diligence with partner nation coordination.

## **(U) Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***(U) Recommendation B.1***

**(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. European Command, in coordination with the Commander, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, identify and implement courses of action to mitigate coordination challenges with partner nations regarding the classification level of information.**

### ***(U) Management Comments Required***

(U) We provided the draft report on March 4, 2024, and requested written comments on the recommendations by April 3, 2024. The Commander, U.S. European Command, did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. We request that the Commander provide comments within 30 days of the final report.

## (U) Appendix A

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### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from December 2022 through March 2024 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Components associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Components about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Components did not provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

### (U) Methodology

(U) To determine the extent to which USEUCOM had controls in place for validating Ukraine's request for military equipment and assistance, and coordinated with partner nations, we interviewed DoD officials from:

- (U) USEUCOM J5 (Plans, Policy, Strategy, and Capabilities Directorate);
- ~~(U)~~ USEUCOM [REDACTED]
- (U) USEUCOM SCCs:
  - (U) USAREUR-AF
  - (U) NAVEUR-NAVAF
  - (U) USAFE-AFAFRICA
  - (U) U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa
  - (U) SOCEUR
- (U) SAG-U
- (U) IDCC
- (U) OUSD(P)

(U) We also attended working groups corroborating the existence and function of the following working groups.

- (U) USEUCOM J5's FFWG
- (U) SAG-U-hosted Training and Logistics Conferences
- (U) SAG-U's action officer and O-6 JARBs

(U) In addition, we reviewed the following guidance.

- (U) USEUCOM Instruction 7101.01, "Managers' Internal Control Program," January 7, 2011
- (U) USEUCOM Instruction 6001.01A, "United States European Command Knowledge Management Program," March 13, 2018
- (U) GAO-14-704G, "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government," September 2014

## **(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance**

(U) We assessed internal controls to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed the control environment, risk assessment, and information and communication related to USEUCOM validating UAF requests for military equipment and assistance and DoD coordination with partner nations. For example, we reviewed risk assessment control activities within USEUCOM by identifying processes within USEUCOM and its SCCs for validating and prioritizing UAF requests. In addition, we reviewed information and communication controls by identifying methods that the DoD used to coordinate with partner nations to overcome communication challenges associated with fulfilling UAF requests. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

## **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

## **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, no prior coverage has been conducted on the controls USEUCOM has in place for:

- (U) validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance; or
- (U) coordinating Ukraine's requests with partner nations.


## (U) Appendix B

(U)	Presidential Drawdown 30 Table, January 19, 2023
	Additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems
	Eight Avenger air defense systems
	59 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) with 590 TOW anti-tank missiles and 295,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition
	90 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) with 20 mine rollers
	53 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)
	350 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
	20,000 155mm artillery rounds
	Approximately 600 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds
	95,000 105mm artillery rounds
	Approximately 11,800 120mm mortar rounds
	Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
	12 ammunition support vehicles
	6 command post vehicles
	22 tactical vehicles to tow weapons
	High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs)
	Approximately 2,000 anti-armor rockets
	Over 3,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition
	Demolition equipment for obstacle clearing
	Claymore anti-personnel munitions
	Night vision devices
	Spare parts and other field equipment
	<b>(U)</b>

(U) Source: Defense Media Activity.

## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>(U) FFWG</b>	Future Forces Ukraine Working Group
<b>(U) IDCC</b>	International Donor Coordination Center
<b>(U) JARB</b>	Joint Acquisition Review Board
<b>(U) LOR</b>	Letter of Request
<b>(U) NAVEUR-NAVAF</b>	U.S. Naval Forces Europe–Africa
<b>(CUI)</b>	
<b>(U) OUSD(P)</b>	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
<b>(U) PD</b>	Presidential Drawdown
<b>(U) PDA</b>	Presidential Drawdown Authority
<b>(U) SAG-U</b>	Security Assistance Group–Ukraine
<b>(U) SCC</b>	Service Component Command
<b>(U) SOCEUR</b>	U.S. Special Operations Command Europe
<b>(U) UAF</b>	Ukrainian Armed Forces
<b>(U) UDCG</b>	Ukraine Defense Contact Group
<b>(U) USAFE-AFAFRICA</b>	U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa
<b>(U) USAREUR-AF</b>	U.S. Army Europe and Africa
<b>(U) USEUCOM</b>	U.S. European Command

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