


~~CUI//REL TO USA, TWN~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

SEPTEMBER 11, 2024



(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan

~~Controlled by: DoD-OIG~~
~~Controlled by: Evaluations~~
~~CUI Category: PRIVILEGE; OPSEC~~
~~Distribution/Dissemination Control: None~~
~~POC: Program Director, [REDACTED]~~

INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

~~CUI//REL TO USA, TWN~~





(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan

September 11, 2024

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the DoD effectively and efficiently implemented accountability and quality controls for items provided to Taiwan using the Presidential Drawdown Authority. We also assessed the DoD's tracking and inventorying of the presidential drawdown (PD) items and the sufficiency of the DoD's processes to ensure that the PD items met applicable standards.

(U) Background

(U) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Security has said that Taiwan is a key U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a chief supplier of semiconductors vital to the global economy and U.S. defense manufacturing. With the marked increase in People's Liberation Army air and military activity around Taiwan since 2021, the United States prioritized strengthening Taiwan's defense capabilities by using the Presidential Drawdown Authority to directly transfer existing U.S. military stock to Taiwan. On July 28, 2023, the President authorized the drawdown of up to \$345 million in DoD defense articles and services to Taiwan.

(U) Finding

(U) The DoD did not effectively or efficiently implement accountability and quality controls for items delivered to Taiwan using the Presidential Drawdown Authority. More than 340 pallets of items sustained water damage while they remained at the aerial

(U) Finding (cont'd)

(U) port of embarkation at Travis Air Force Base for 3 months pending a flight to Taiwan. This occurred because the Army did not request the first Special Airlift Assignment Mission flight for these items until almost 2 months after items were sent to the aerial port of embarkation, and the port was not equipped with sufficient storage capacity or able to fully mitigate the items' exposure to adverse weather conditions.

~~(U)~~ Additionally, the DoD provided unserviceable and poorly packaged equipment and munitions to Taiwan. This occurred because losing units did not always comply with shipping standards. [REDACTED]

(U) As a result, Taiwan and the DoD incurred additional costs to remediate damage to PD items provided to Taiwan. Additionally, the DoD's delivery of non-mission-capable PD items to Taiwan inhibits the DoD's ability to achieve its security cooperation goals and risks degrading Taiwan's confidence in the United States.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We are making the following recommendations to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Director for transferring items to Taiwan using the Presidential Drawdown Authority.

- (U) Coordinate with the Military Services, Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, and other stakeholders to develop a plan to ensure that PD execute orders for Taiwan explain each Military Service's responsibilities and the timelines for shipping PD items to ports of embarkation and delivering PD items to ports of debarkation in Taiwan.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

- (U) Coordinate with the Military Services to update Defense Security Cooperation Agency guidance to include processes for the Military Services to check the quality and quantity of items before they leave the United States, in situations where U.S. personnel will not directly oversee the transfer of the items to the receiving country.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The DSCA Assistant Director of International Operations, responding on behalf of the DSCA Director, broadly agreed with the recommendations, but requested that we redirect them to the Joint Staff and the Military Services. Based on the Assistant Director's comments and subsequent discussions with DSCA personnel, we revised Recommendation 1 to specify that the DSCA Director should coordinate with the Military Services, Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, and other stakeholders for Taiwan PD EXORDs. The Assistant Director did not specify any actions the DSCA would take to address the recommendations; therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. We request that the DSCA Director provide additional comments addressing the recommendations within 30 days of the final report.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	1.a, 1.b, and 2	None	None (U)

(U) Please provide Management Comments by October 11, 2024.

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

September 11, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the DoD's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan (Report No. DODIG-2024-130)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the senior official responding on behalf of the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency did not fully address the recommendations presented in the report.

(U) Therefore, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until management has agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendations and management officials submit adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Bryan Clark".

Bryan Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations

Distribution:

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the DoD effectively and efficiently implemented accountability and quality controls for items provided to Taiwan using the Presidential Drawdown Authority.¹ We also assessed the DoD's tracking and inventorying of the presidential drawdown (PD) items and the sufficiency of the DoD's processes to ensure that the PD items met applicable standards.

(U) Background

(U) During a September 19, 2023 House Armed Services Committee hearing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Security stated that Taiwan is a key U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a chief supplier of semiconductors vital to the global economy and U.S. defense manufacturing. The Deputy also stated that Taiwan faced increased attempts at intimidation and coercion from the People's Republic of China (PRC), including increased military actions. The Joint Staff Vice Director for Strategy, Policy, and Plans added that this increased pressure coincides with a marked increase in People's Liberation Army air and military activity around Taiwan since 2021.

(U) The U.S. ability to provide military assistance to Taiwan was established in 1979 by the Taiwan Relations Act.² The purpose of the Act is to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to maintain U.S.-Taiwan relations. According to the Act, it is U.S. policy to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character." Additionally, the Act states that the United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles needed to enable Taiwan to maintain a self-defense capability and that the President and Congress, with a review by military authorities, will determine this need.

(U) According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Security and the Joint Staff Vice Director for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, the United States is committed to curbing the PRC's "provocative behavior" around Taiwan because strengthening deterrence against the PRC's aggressive actions is essential to the United States' national security and Indo-Pacific strategies. In 2023, the United States prioritized Taiwan's defense capabilities by using the Presidential Drawdown Authority to directly transfer existing U.S. military stock to Taiwan.

¹ (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created, or owned, unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

² (U) Public Law 96-8, "Taiwan Relations Act," January 1, 1979.

(U) The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) “Handbook for Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services” (DSCA Handbook) states that PDs are different from normal security assistance and describes PDs as an important foreign policy tool to further U.S. foreign policy objectives.³ The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2023 authorized the President to draw down up to \$1 billion from existing DoD stock to provide military assistance to Taiwan.⁴ On July 28, 2023, the President authorized the drawdown of up to \$345 million of DoD defense articles and services to provide assistance to Taiwan.

(U) The Presidential Drawdown Process

(U) According to DoD 5105.38-M, in non-emergency drawdowns, the equipment and services to be provided cannot exceed the total value authorized for the drawdown.⁵ Additionally, items supplied in a drawdown must have already been in DoD stocks or on order at the time the drawdown was approved and must be provided in condition codes “B,” “Fully Mission Capable,” or “-10/-20 standards.” Table 1 describes the condition codes. The DSCA Handbook states that the urgency of the drawdown process might, in some cases, prevent completing full pre-delivery maintenance of items. However, the DSCA Handbook also cautions that the delivery of non-mission-capable items may result in criticism of the U.S. Government.

(U) Table 1. Supply Condition Codes

(U) Condition Code	Code Description
“B” (Serviceable/Issuable with Qualification)	New, used, repaired, or reconditioned materiel which is serviceable and issuable for its intended purpose, but is restricted from issue to specific units, activities, or geographical areas by reason of its limited usefulness or short service life expectancy. Includes materiel with 3 to 6 months shelf-life remaining.
Fully Mission Capable	A materiel condition indicating that systems and equipment are safe and have all mission-essential sub-systems installed and operated as designated by applicable Army regulation; equipment is on hand and able to perform its combat missions.
Meeting -10/-20 standards or better	Meets specific maintenance requirements for different types of equipment as established in Army Regulation 750-1. (U)

(U) Sources: DoD 5105.38-M; Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services; Army Regulation 750-1.

³ (U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “DSCA Handbook for Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services,” June 2004.

⁴ (U) Public Law 117-263, “James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,” section 5505, “Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan,” December 23, 2022.

⁵ (U) DSCA, DoD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003.

(U) Presidential Drawdown Laws and Policies

(U) Multiple laws and policies outline PD authorities, processes, key stakeholders, and requirements involved with the transfer of PD items to Taiwan.

(U) Section 2318, Title 22, United States Code, “Special Authority”

(U) Section 2318, title 22, United States Code, establishes the special authority of the President to direct the drawdown of military items, military services, and military training and education in the case of an emergency and when it is in the national interest. Section 2318 also states that contracted transportation services may be acquired to transfer drawdown materiel and services, if the cost to the U.S. Government for those contracts is less than the cost of providing such services from existing agency assets.

(U) DoD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual”

(U) DoD 5105.38-M provides guidance for security assistance programs in compliance with legislation including the Foreign Assistance Act.⁶ DoD 5105.38-M includes guidance for special programs like PDs and for the transportation of materiel. DoD 5105.38-M also describes the types of PDs and establishes responsibilities related to the transfer of drawdown materiel and services for the DSCA, Military Departments and Services, and elements of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). DoD 5105.38-M also establishes that PD support packages should include required operation and maintenance training and defines the condition in which materiel is to be transferred.


(U) DSCA “Handbook for Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services”

(U) The DSCA Handbook is a guide for DSCA personnel involved in the PD process. The DSCA Handbook states that PDs are different from normal security assistance procedures and describes PDs as an important foreign policy tool to further U.S. foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, the DSCA Handbook is a general guide for action-level personnel in planning and executing drawdowns of DoD defense articles and services, and outlines internal DSCA responsibilities for drawdowns.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities

(U) The following organizations have responsibilities related to the initiation, oversight, management, and handling of PD items for Taiwan. Figure 1 depicts the roles, responsibilities, and relationship of these entities with relation to the Taiwan PD effort.

⁶ (U) Public Law 87–195, “Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.”

(U) Figure 1. Presidential Drawdown Roles and Responsibilities**(U) LEGEND****(U) EXORD** Execute Order**(U) POE**

Port of Embarkation

(U) POD Port of Debarkation**(U) USINDOPACOM**

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.***(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency***

(U) According to DoD 5105.38-M, the DSCA is responsible for directing, administering, and supervising the execution of all Security Assistance programs for the DoD. The DSCA Handbook states that the DSCA is responsible for issuing the DoD's execute order (EXORD) for PDs and supervising the execution of the drawdown. DSCA Country Portfolio Directors, who are assigned to specific receiving countries, develop the PD EXORD, which is usually released with the PD announcement. The DSCA Country Portfolio Director monitors all actions related to the PD after issuing the PD EXORD, primarily by reviewing the Military Services' status reports.

(U) U.S. Transportation Command

(U) USTRANSCOM is responsible for coordinating and conducting air and sealift of drawdown items. USTRANSCOM executes airlift through the Air Force's Air Mobility Command, which serves as the single manager for airlift for the DoD Components.

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

~~(U)~~ The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is responsible for using and integrating Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force forces within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility to achieve U.S. national security objectives while protecting national interests. According to USINDOPACOM's Security Cooperation Division Regional Director for Taiwan, once senior leaders decide what items will be provided to a country within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, USINDOPACOM's role is limited to maintaining awareness of delivery statuses. [REDACTED]

(U) Military Departments and Services

(U) According to the DSCA Handbook, the Military Services issue Service-level EXORDs that direct the actual selection and drawdown of items. Additionally, DoD 5105.38-M and the DSCA Handbook state that Military Departments are responsible for packing, crating, and handling, including the movement of the drawdown items to ports of embarkation within the continental United States or other consolidation points. The DSCA Handbook explains that under normal circumstances the Service tasked with providing items must fund and complete the transportation of the items and should reimburse USTRANSCOM for shipping.

(U) American Institute in Taiwan

(U) The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is a nonprofit private corporation established shortly after the U.S. Government changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act states that any programs, transactions, or other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any U.S. Government agency with respect to Taiwan must, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through the AIT.⁷ According to the Deputy Chief of the AIT Security Cooperation Office (SCO), the AIT SCO operates under the authority of the DSCA and manages foreign military sales and transfers of PD items to Taiwan.

(U) Army Materiel Command

~~(U)~~ The Army Materiel Command is responsible for synchronizing and integrating Army capabilities in support of the Chief of Staff of the Army's priorities and combatant command requirements. The Army Materiel Command also manages the global supply chain and synchronizes logistics and sustainment

⁷ (U) Public Law 96-8, "Taiwan Relations Act."

~~(CUI)~~ activities across the Army. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A subsequent fragmentary order tasked the Army Materiel Command to provide the munitions and equipment identified in the PD.

(U) Within the Army Materiel Command, the Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) managed, supplied, and shipped body armor and plates sent to Travis Air Force Base (AFB), California, for the Taiwan PD. According to TACOM leadership, 90 percent of the items TACOM provided for the Taiwan PD came from Sierra Army Depot, which is located 226 miles from Travis AFB.

(U) 60th Aerial Port Squadron

~~(CUI//REL TO USA, TWN)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The APOE's primary function is to facilitate the transition of items from points of origin to the port of debarkation. Within the Air Mobility Command, the 60th Aerial Port Squadron (60 APS) at Travis AFB manages the largest aerial port in the world and serves as the continental U.S. West Coast APOE.

(U) Finding

(U) The DoD Did Not Implement Effective Accountability Controls for Items Provided to Taiwan Through the Presidential Drawdown

(U) The DoD did not effectively or efficiently implement accountability and quality controls for PD items delivered to Taiwan from November 2023 through March 2024. Specifically, more than 340 of 504 total pallets of PD items (about 67 percent) sustained water damage while they remained at the APOE for more than 3 months pending air transport to Taiwan. This occurred because the Army did not begin initiating requests for Special Airlift Assignment Mission (SAAM) flights for these items until December 2023, and the APOE was not equipped with sufficient storage capacity or able to fully mitigate the exposure of the items to adverse weather conditions.⁸

~~(U)~~ Additionally, the DoD provided unserviceable and poorly packaged equipment and munitions to Taiwan. In December 2023, the DoD delivered to Taiwan 120 of these 340 water damaged pallets (about 35 percent), which, according to AIT personnel, contained wet and moldy body armor. Furthermore, in December 2023, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) issued a letter to the AIT SCO stating that Taiwan received 2.7 million rounds of ammunition from the DoD, including some that was expired, in a mix of original, loose, and incorrect packaging. This occurred because losing units did not comply with shipping standards. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) As a result, Taiwan and the DoD incurred additional costs for the PD items provided to Taiwan. For example, in December 2023, Taiwanese authorities spent weeks unpacking, drying, and inventorying the wet and moldy PD equipment. In addition, TACOM personnel told us that they spent \$618,894 in labor and materials to clean and dry wet and moldy body armor at the APOE, and \$113,492 to replace damaged body armor delivered to Taiwan. More broadly, the delivery of non-mission-capable items inhibit the DoD's ability to achieve established security cooperation goals and may lead to loss of partner confidence in the United States.

⁸ (U) SAAM flights are military or commercial flights ordered by the Air Mobility Command in support of DoD and non-DoD missions, including foreign military sales and military assistance programs. Customers request SAAM flights through the SAAM Request System for validation.

(U) PD Items for Taiwan Were Damaged at the Aerial Port of Embarkation Before Shipment

(U) The DoD did not effectively or efficiently implement accountability and quality controls for PD items delivered to Taiwan from November 2023 through March 2024. Specifically, more than 340 pallets of PD items sustained water damage while they remained at the APOE at Travis AFB for more than 3 months pending a flight to Taiwan. Figures 2 and 3 show the extent of water damage to the cardboard “tri-wall” shipping containers. We observed disintegrating tri-walls with visible mold spores, wrapped in plastic that had trapped water, facilitating further deterioration and mold growth.


(U) PD Items Sat at the APOE for at Least 3 Months Before SAAM Flights Were Scheduled to Send It to Taiwan

(U) PD items remained at the APOE for at least 3 months before SAAM flights were scheduled. In October 2023, the 60 APS started receiving PD items for Taiwan at Travis AFB. According to the 60 APS Commander, they assumed the risk of receiving these items before SAAM flights were scheduled. The Commander did this to deconflict simultaneously receiving items expected for a quick turnaround of PD items for Ukraine. According to the 60 APS Commander, the air terminal manager advised them that the PD items for Taiwan would be shipped by November 2023. However, the Army did not immediately schedule the SAAM flights. Therefore, the 60 APS had to store and manage the 340 pallets of PD items contained in standard triple-wall fiberboard containers known as “tri-walls.”

(U) According to Army Sustainment Command records, the Army did not request SAAM flights from Travis AFB to Taiwan until December 7, 2023. The first two flights to Taiwan did not occur until December 28, 2023. The 60 APS Commander stated that it was possible that the Army did not request, or prioritize requesting, SAAM flights for the PD items for Taiwan because Army personnel assumed that the 60 APS would schedule the SAAM flights. However,



(U) Figure 2. Water-Damaged and Collapsing Tri-Walls at the APOE Containing PD Items
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.



(U) Figure 3. Moisture Visible Inside Wrapping and Mold Spores on Tri-Walls Containing PD Items at the APOE
 (U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) for the 60 APS to schedule SAAM flights for items being shipped by another organization would have been outside the normal procedures and would not have aligned with authorities and responsibilities in the PD EXORD.

(U) Personnel from the DSCA, 60 APS, and TACOM independently expressed frustration with unclear roles and responsibilities while fulfilling the PD EXORD.

(U) Therefore, the DSCA Director should provide Country Portfolio Directors with updated guidance for drafting PD EXORDs that clearly explain each Service's specific responsibilities related to the shipment of PD items to ports of embarkation and requesting military or contracted transportation for the delivery of PD items to ports of debarkation.


(U) [Redacted text block]

Table 2 below shows, as of March 2024, the dates the Army Sustainment Command requested 12 of the 13 SAAM flights to Taiwan, when the flights arrived in Taiwan, and describes the items and number of pallets that were on those flights.

(U) Personnel from the 60 APS Attempted to Mitigate PD Items' Exposure to Weather

(U) Personnel from the 60 APS attempted to mitigate the PD items' exposure to weather. The 60 APS Commander stated that once it became clear that the items destined for Taiwan would need to be stored at Travis AFB for an extended period, 60 APS and TACOM representatives at Sierra Army Depot began exploring possible courses of action, including procuring large tents to cover the items. According to the 60 APS Commander, because TACOM provided the items, TACOM had the authority to decide on the course of action, including possibly sending the items back to Sierra Army Depot. The 60 APS Commander further stated that TACOM personnel decided to keep the items at Travis AFB because of the potential cost to move it.

(U) Instead of procuring tents or returning the items, 60 APS personnel repurposed weapon "igloos" and pallet loading and building areas and borrowed hangar space from neighboring units to temporarily store the PD items out of the weather. However, we observed that although many of these ad hoc storage areas had roofs, they did not have walls, leaving the tri-walls exposed to blowing rain, fog, humidity, and heat. Because the ad hoc storage areas were insufficient, 60 APS personnel were forced to leave tri-walls containing PD items on the tarmac near the main warehouse as more items continued to arrive. Figure 4 shows partially covered space and the tarmac area the 60 APS used to store PD items for Taiwan.



(U) Figure 4. PD Items Stored in an APOE Loading Area
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Travis AFB endured weather conditions that resulted in PD items' damage. According to the National Weather Service, the area around Travis AFB received 6.33 inches of rain from October through December 2023 and an additional 12.9 inches of rain from January through February 2024. The delayed SAAM

(U) flight requests, the decision to hold the items at Travis AFB, and the inability to effectively mitigate weather exposure resulted in damage to PD items being provided to Taiwan.

(U) The DoD Delivered Unserviceable Items to Taiwan

(U) The DoD provided unserviceable and poorly packaged equipment and munitions to Taiwan. According to AIT personnel, Taiwan received 120 pallets of wet and moldy body armor from the DoD in December 2023. Furthermore, in December 2023, Taiwan's MND issued a letter to the AIT SCO stating that Taiwan received 2.7 million rounds of ammunition from the DoD, including some that was expired, in a mix of original, loose, and incorrect packaging.

(U) The DoD Delivered Body Armor "Soaking Wet and Full of Mold" to Taiwan

(U) According to internal emails from the AIT, on December 28 and December 29, 2023, 120 water-damaged pallets containing more than 3,000 mildewed body armor plates and 500 wet and moldy tactical vests arrived at the aerial port of debarkation at Taipei International Airport. Figure 5 shows one of the damaged pallets and moldy body armor plates delivered to Taiwan.



(U) According to AIT personnel, the water-damaged tri-walls delivered to Taipei International Airport contained vests and plates that were “soaking wet and full of mold.” An official from TACOM—the organization that the Army relies on to develop, provide, or sustain anything a Soldier wears, drives, or shoots—stated that mold spores present a health and safety concern, especially to anyone with pre-existing respiratory issues, and that they recommended that no one wear the moldy equipment.

(U) The DoD Delivered Old and Poorly Packaged Ammunition to Taiwan

(U) According to a letter issued by Taiwan’s MND, the DoD shipped PD ammunition to Taiwan in of a mix of original, substitute, and loose packaging, which made it difficult to accurately manage or inventory the munitions. These shipments included an estimated 2.7 million rounds of ammunition manufactured in 1983 that were poorly packaged, which made it difficult for Taiwanese personnel to inventory and account for the ammunition. The AIT SCO Deputy Director described open boxes of ammunition that looked as if they were “obviously extra boxes” of ammunition. The AIT SCO Branch Chief stated that the condition of the shipments did not leave senior leaders from the Taiwan MND with a favorable impression because the boxes of ammunition looked as though units “cleared out stuff they didn’t want.”

(U) The DoD’s Losing Units Did Not Always Comply with Shipping Standards

(U) The DoD’s losing units did not always comply with shipping standards when shipping PD items to Taiwan. We observed items shipped without proper packaging or DoD-required elements, such as serviceability paperwork, labels, wrapping, and cushioning. Security personnel from the 60 APS brought to our attention six M240B machine guns that were shipped to Travis AFB for onward movement to Taiwan loose in a large cardboard box without any wrapping or cushioning, which was required by MIL-STD-2073-1E. Figure 6 shows the condition in which a National Guard unit shipped the machine guns from Clovis, New Mexico, to Travis AFB.



(U) The 60 APS Director of Operations notified the Army Sustainment Command and the Army National Guard about the improperly shipped weapons and provided the special packing instructions, which included a diagram of a properly packed weapons container. According to 60 APS personnel, the port squadron does not inspect all packages shipped through the port, nor does it inspect all weapons shipped through the port. The 60 APS' responsibility is limited to identifying weapons that have not been clearly marked or packed. The 60 APS, and other APOEs, do not conduct quality inspections of the actual contents of these packages, and they are not responsible for doing so.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] According to the AIT SCO Deputy Chief, security concerns dictate that PD items delivered to Taipei International Airport be treated like sensitive material. The Deputy Chief further stated that at the direction of the AIT Director, no U.S. personnel are present for these deliveries. The Deputy Chief also told us that the PD items are unloaded by contractors, delivered to warehouses off the premises, and then inventoried by Taiwan's MND personnel. Additionally, the Deputy Chief stated that there are usually no U.S. personnel at this warehouse. Therefore, the PD items, which have been provided by multiple military units, undergoes no final check for quality and accurate quantities before non-U.S. contractors hand it over to Taiwan's MND.

(U) Therefore, the DSCA Director, in coordination with the Military Services, should update DSCA guidance for PD deliveries to locations where U.S. personnel will not directly oversee the transfer of items to the receiving country to include a process or processes for the DoD or the Services to check the quality and quantities of PD items before the items leave the United States.

(U) Taiwan and the DoD Incurred Additional Costs, and the United States Risked Potential Loss of Partner Confidence After Providing Damaged PD Items to Taiwan

(U) Taiwan and the DoD incurred additional costs for the PD items provided to Taiwan. Damage to PD items the DoD provided to Taiwan required remediation of the damage or replacement of the items. More broadly, the delivery of non-mission-capable equipment inhibits the DoD's ability to achieve established security cooperation goals and may undermine partner confidence in the United States.

(U) The United States and Taiwan Incurred Additional Costs Due to Time and Money Spent Drying, Repackaging, and Replacing Wet and Damaged PD Equipment

(U) The United States and Taiwan incurred additional costs resulting from time and money spent to dry, repack, and replace wet and damaged PD equipment. The AIT SCO Deputy Director stated that in December 2023, Taiwanese authorities unpacked, dried, and inventoried the wet and moldy equipment in a process that reportedly took weeks. Additionally, in January 2024, TACOM personnel traveled from Sierra Army Depot to Travis AFB to begin cleaning and drying water-damaged equipment that had not been shipped to Taiwan. The 60 APS personnel repacked this equipment for shipment to Taiwan. This effort required more than 2,405 labor hours to complete, costing TACOM \$618,894.89, including material and travel costs, according to representatives from the TACOM Budget Directorate. TACOM also replaced 105 water-damaged body armor plates and 3 vests that had not yet been shipped to Taiwan, with a total replacement value of \$113,491.62. As of May 31, 2024, the DoD had replaced none of the moldy tactical vests or body armor plates—equipment that a TACOM official recommended that no one wear—that were delivered to Taiwan.

(U) The DoD's Delivery of Non–Mission-Capable Items Inhibits the DoD's Ability to Achieve Security Cooperation Goals and May Decrease U.S. Partner Confidence

(U) The DoD's delivery of non–mission-capable items inhibits its ability to achieve established security cooperation goals and may decrease partner confidence in the United States. The DSCA PD Handbook states that “while some U.S. and host country policy personnel may push for quick delivery over delivery of mission capable equipment,” delivering items that the recipient cannot use right away will result in a “high probability that the [U.S. Government] will subsequently be criticized.” The AIT SCO Branch Chief stated that “the Taiwan Army were not impressed” with the state of the items provided through the PD authorization. According to the AIT SCO Deputy Director, Taiwan's MND had already presented a report to the President of the governing authority in Taiwan outlining problems with the quality of weapons and ammunition being delivered before the arrival of the wet and moldy body armor.⁹ In April 2024, we received a copy of the Taiwan MND's classified report dated March 5, 2024, that provided information related to damaged PD items. As the USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Regional Director for this region stated simply, “Quality issues affect security cooperation with Taiwan, and DoD should strive to give serviceable materiel to PD recipients.”

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Responses

(U) Revised Recommendation

(U) Based on DSCA comments on the draft report and additional discussions with DSCA personnel, we revised draft Recommendation 1 to specify that the DSCA Director should coordinate with the Military Services, Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM, and other stakeholders to establish requirements for Taiwan PD EXORDs.

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in coordination with the Military Services, Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, and other stakeholders, develop a plan to ensure that Taiwan presidential drawdown execute orders, at a minimum:

- a. **(U) Explain each Service's responsibilities and the associated timelines for activities related to the shipment of presidential drawdown items to ports of embarkation.**

⁹ (EU) [REDACTED]

- b. **(U) Define each Service’s responsibilities and the associated timelines for activities related to requesting transportation for the delivery of presidential drawdown items to ports of debarkation in Taiwan.**

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in coordination with the Military Services, update Defense Security Cooperation Agency guidance to include processes for the Services to check the quality and quantities of presidential drawdown items before the items leave the United States, in situations where U.S. personnel will not directly oversee the transfer of items to the receiving country.

(U) DSCA Comments

(U) The DSCA Assistant Director of International Operations, responding on behalf of the DSCA Director, broadly agreed with the intent of Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2, but requested that we redirect the recommendations to the Joint Staff and Military Services. The Assistant Director acknowledged that, “[a]s evidenced by the report, the process by which Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) equipment is coordinated and transported can be improved to mitigate further risks of damage to materiel prior to delivery.” However, the Assistant Director stated that supporting Military Departments are solely responsible for determining how to best source, and when to provide, authorized drawdown support for DSCA PD EXORDs. Additionally, the Assistant Director stated that the DSCA Country Portfolio Directors lack the logistical and transportation expertise to implement guidance on transportation plans and quality checks for Presidential Drawdown equipment. Finally, the Assistant Director stated that the Defense Transportation Regulation would be a more appropriate vehicle for capturing these recommendations related to Military Service components’ transportation roles and responsibilities.

(U) Our Response

(U) We revised draft report Recommendation 1 based on the Assistant Director’s comments and subsequent discussions with DSCA personnel. However, although the Assistant Director broadly agreed with the recommendations, we do not agree with their request to redirect the recommendations to the Joint Staff and Military Services. According to DoDD 5105.65, the DSCA is responsible for directing, administering, and providing DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions for the execution of DoD security cooperation programs, which include PDs. Additionally, DoDD 5105.65 states that the DSCA should provide general oversight of DoD security cooperation efforts

(U) focusing on the timely transfer of defense articles and services in support of DoD strategic and regional objectives. Therefore, the Military Departments and other DoD Components provide support to the DSCA to carry out their assigned responsibilities and functions. Furthermore, it is necessary for the DSCA to coordinate with the Military Departments to develop PD EXORDs.

(U) The intent of these recommendations is for the DSCA to provide the Military Services with PD-related responsibilities and the timelines for conducting activities to supply PD items to the ports of embarkation and deliver the items to ports of debarkation, which, according to DoDD 5105.65, is within the scope of the DSCA's authority. For example, the DSCA could state in PD EXORDs that the Military Services are responsible for scheduling delivery services of PD items from the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation. Another example would be for the DSCA to state in PD EXORDs that PD items cannot arrive at the port of embarkation more than a specified number of days before their scheduled departure. Additionally, because each PD is unique, we believe that modifying the Defense Transportation Regulation as the DSCA suggests would not align with the intent of our recommendations. As a result, we are not redirecting the recommendations.

(U) The Assistant Director did not specify any actions the DSCA would take to address our recommendations; therefore, the recommendations are unresolved and open. We request that the DSCA Director provide additional comments within 30 days of the final report.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from November 2023 through July 2024 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) Our evaluation focused on the guidance, resources, costs, and performance associated with DoD provision of PD items to Taiwan. The scope included the aerial port of embarkation, aerial port of debarkation, losing units, and challenges encountered at each location. Additionally, we focused on the oversight of the process for the Taiwan PD, which included the Army, the DSCA, USTRANCOM, and USINDOPACOM.

(U) We identified and reviewed laws and policy to understand the requirements for the Taiwan PD. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria.

- (U) Public Law 87-195, “Foreign Assistance Act of 1961”
- (U) Public Law 96-8, “Taiwan Relations Act”
- (U) Public Law 117-263, “James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,” section 5505, “Additional Authorization to Support Taiwan”
- (U) Section 2318, title 22, United States Code, “Special Authority”
- (U) DoD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003
- (U) DoD Security Cooperation Agency, “DSCA Handbook for Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services,” June 2004

(U) We conducted a site visit to Travis AFB to observe the shipping and handling of PD cargo, captured photographic and video evidence to support our observations, and interviewed personnel involved in the shipping, handling, and receiving of PD items. Additionally, we issued requests for information and conducted interviews with the following entities.

- (U) DSCA
- (U) AIT
- (U) USINDOPACOM
- (U) USTRANSCOM
- (U) U.S. Army Pacific
- (U) Army TACOM
- (U) 60 APS

(U) From November 2023 through June 2024 we obtained the following supporting documentation from stakeholders for Taiwan PD items and cargo.

- (U) Air manifests
- (U) Airlift schedules
- (U) Fragmentary orders
- (U) Load plans
- (U) PD EXORDs
- (U) Photographs of cargo containing PD items delivered to Taiwan
- (U) SAAM flight requests
- (U) Taiwan's MND letters detailing issues with PD items

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD OIG issued 12 reports discussing PDs for Ukraine. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) DODIG-2024-028, “Management Advisory: US Army Accountability of Equipment transferred to Ukraine,” November 17, 2023

(U) This report is classified. However, we reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2024-002, “Management Advisory: Evaluation of the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine’s Role in Coordinating the Movement of Defense Articles to Ukraine,” November 2, 2023

(U) This report is classified. However, we reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-115, “Evaluation of Land-Based Security Controls for Equipment Being Transferred by Rail to Ukraine,” September 6, 2023

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the DoD implemented security controls in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulation and DoD policies for the ground movement and transfer of cargo headed to Ukraine by rail in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-094, “Special Report: Lessons Learned from DoD OIG Reports to Inform the DoD’s Ukraine Response,” July 20, 2023

(U) This special report reviewed previous DoD OIG reports for common themes and areas of focus during contingencies and other DoD operations and prepared this document to highlight lessons learned concerning facility security, maintenance operations and equipment storage, supply chain management, and contract pricing and oversight. There are no recommendations in this report, however it provided lessons learned that we considered during our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-092, "Management Advisory: DoD's Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine," July 5, 2023

(U) This report contains controlled unclassified information. However, we reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-090, "Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring," June 28, 2023

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD was conducting Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of defense articles provided to Ukraine in accordance with DoD policy. The management advisory contains recommendations to the DSCA Director and the Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation-Ukraine, with coordination from other DoD stakeholders. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-087, "Management Advisory: Basic Issue Items and Components of End Items Shortages in the Army's Prepositioned Stock-5 Program," June 15, 2023

(U) The purpose of this management advisory was to inform Headquarters, Department of the Army and Army Materiel Command officials responsible for the Army Prepositioned Stock program and Army-wide equipment transfer decisions of shortages in Basic Issue Items and Components of End Items from Army Prepositioned Stock-5 equipment. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-084, "Evaluation of Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred Via Air to Ukraine within the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility," June 8, 2023

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD implemented accountability controls for defense items transferred via air to the Government of Ukraine within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulations and DoD instructions. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-081, "Audit of the Tracking and Reporting of DoD-Owned Shipping Containers," June 8, 2023

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine to what extent the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps complied with DoD and Service requirements to track and report information related to DoD owned shipping containers and include those shipping containers in an accountable property system of record. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-076, "Management Advisory: Maintenance Concerns for the Army's Prepositioned Stock-5 Equipment Designated for Ukraine," May 23, 2023

(U) The purpose of this management advisory was to inform the Department of the Army, Army Materiel Command, Army Sustainment Command, and U.S. European Command officials responsible for the designation and transfer of military equipment to the Ukrainian Armed Forces of concerns for the readiness of Army Prepositioned Stock-5 equipment. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-062, "Management Advisory: The U.S. Transportation Command's Compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014," March 31, 2023

(U) The purpose of this management advisory is to provide USTRANSCOM leadership with the DoD OIG findings and recommendations specific to USTRANSCOM's compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) DODIG-2023-053, "Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued in Response to Ukraine and the NATO Defense Forces," Feb. 27, 2023

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the Army Sustainment Command and 405th Army Field Support Brigade maintained and accounted for Army pre-positioned stocks of military equipment in their storage areas and planned for the repair of issued Army Prepositioned Stock-2 equipment in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defense Forces. We reviewed the recommendations, but conducted no follow up since the recommendations were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency



DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
2800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2800

31 JULY 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: (U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency Response to Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (Project No. D2024-DEV0PD-0029.000)

Reference: Evaluation of the DoD's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan (Project No. D2024-DEV0PD-0029.000), July 2, 2024

(U) Thank you for the opportunity to review the referenced Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) draft report. As evidenced by the report, the process by which Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) equipment is coordinated and transported can be improved to mitigate future risks of damage to materiel prior to delivery. Taiwan is a key security cooperation partner, and it is in the interest of the U.S. Government to ensure that equipment delivered to Taiwan is sufficient for operational use. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is fully willing to do its part to improve this process.

(U) In broad terms, DSCA is in support of the intent behind DODOIG's recommendations. I believe there is merit to DSCA reviewing potential clarifications in the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) to refine responsibilities and expectations regarding Presidential Drawdown (PD) equipment conditions. However, the concerns illustrated in the draft recommendations are best directed to the Joint Staff and Military Services as primary responsibility owner, given their execution responsibilities. Further concerns are detailed below:

- (U) **DOD OIG Recommendation #1:** *“Provide Defense Security Cooperation Agency Country Portfolio Directors with updated guidance for drafting execute orders, including explaining roles and responsibilities related to the shipment of equipment to ports of embarkation. Also, define a process and specific responsibilities for requesting transportation for the delivery of equipment to ports of debarkation in Taiwan.”*
 - (U) The DSCA PD Execute Order (EXORD) authorizes a Military Department to provide drawdown support to an assisted partner and requires the value of delivered assistance to be reported to DSCA. However, each supporting Military Department is solely responsible to determine how to best source, and when to provide authorized drawdown support.
 - (U) DSCA Country Portfolio Directors, who develop and execute PD EXORDs, are not logisticians nor transportation experts. Without additional resources allocated towards increasing this expertise, this limitation would create hurdles to implementing guidance on transportation plans and quality checks for PDA equipment.

(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency (cont'd)

- (U) The Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR) provides roles/responsibilities for all shipments that enter the Defense Transportation Service – this is a U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)-owned document for DOD transportation. Therefore, the DTR may be a more appropriate vehicle for capturing OIG's recommendations related to Military Service components' transportation roles/responsibilities.
- (U) **DOD OIG Recommendation #2:** *“Coordinate with the Military Services to update Defense Security Cooperation Agency guidance to include processes for Military Services to check equipment quality and quantities before it leaves the United States, in situations where U.S. personnel will not directly oversee the transfer of the equipment to the receiving country.”*
 - (U) DSCA lacks the statutory authority to enforce changes to Military Service components' roles, responsibilities, and quality assurance procedures for drawn down equipment. Per 10 U.S.C. Chapter. 5, it is the Joint Staff's responsibility to publish Department of Defense operational direction to the Military Departments.
 - (U) Each Military Service has their own Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and policies on condition code criteria. DSCA can reference that Military Services should follow these SOPs but should not develop duplicate processes that could contradict them.
 - (U) As referenced in the OIG's report, DSCA has already implemented SAMM guidance on condition codes for drawn down equipment, which requires items be in Condition Code B, Fully Mission capable, or -10/-20 Standards, (SAMM, C11.2.4.1). Any further guidance on quality reviews of equipment is best addressed by the Joint Staff and TRANSCOM.

(U) With these concerns in mind, I believe OIG's recommendations may be better addressed if directed towards the J4 Logistics Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Military Services. The Joint Staff, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, can issue a General Administration (GENDADMIN) message or a PD EXORD in lieu of the existing DSCA-issued EXORD to fully implement these recommendations with direct authority over the Military Service components executing PD equipment deliveries. DSCA would be better poised to take a supporting role to the Joint Staff, Military Services, and TRANSCOM by capturing their lessons learned or overarching guidance in the SAMM and coordinating on other relevant procedures.

(U) If you have questions on this memorandum, please contact [REDACTED]


ROBERT HELFANT
Assistant Director
International Operations

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

(U) APS	Aerial Port Squadron
(U) AFB	Air Force Base
(U) AIT	American Institute in Taiwan
(U) APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation (lowercase in text)
(U) DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(U) EXORD	Execute Order (lowercase in text)
(U) MND	Ministry of National Defense
(U) PD	Presidential Drawdown
(U) PRC	People's Republic of China
(U) SAAM	Special Airlift Assignment Mission
(U) SCO	Security Cooperation Office
(U) TACOM	Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command
(U) USINDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(U) USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

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