Federal Reports

This report presents the results of our audit of service and operational performance at previously audited mail processing facilities.

Background

The U.S. Postal Service needs effective and productive operations to fulfill its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and affordable mail service. It has a vast transportation network that moves mail and equipment between approximately 315 mail processing facilities. During fiscal years 2023 and 2024, we audited 24 mail processing facilities, assessing transportation and processing operational efficiency.

What We Did

Our objective was to evaluate trends in service and operational performance at previously audited mail processing facilities to determine potential areas for improvement. For this audit, we interviewed regional and mail processing facility management, analyzed pertinent Postal Service system data for 24 previously audited mail processing facilities, and revisited six of these facilities.

What We Found

We identified persistent issues in the areas of delayed mail reporting, late and canceled outbound trips, and safety and security policies. In addition, though scanning compliance improved at some facilities, scanning scores were still generally below the goal. We also found that service performance for First‑Class Mail stayed relatively consistent, but was below target, while service for Priority Mail and Ground Advantage declined. While the lack of oversight by management continues to contribute to most of the issues found, the Postal Service has opportunities to improve information accuracy and enforcement of existing policy. Specifically, facilities continued to have inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the Mail Condition Visualization system due to a lack of training and out-of-date policy. We found incomplete scanning load and unload data was due to a lack of scanner availability and accountability. Many of these facilities continue to have high late and canceled outbound trip percentages caused by inconsistent reviews of transportation schedules. Finally, we found that facilities did not consistently follow mail safety and security policies and procedures.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) did not properly design, implement, comply with, or manage requirements of the Cybersecurity Retention Incentive (Cyber Incentive) program, which paid more than $138 million between fiscal years 2020 through 2024.  These deficiencies resulted in CISA not using Federal funds efficiently or effectively to retain mission-critical cybersecurity employees.   • CISA did not narrowly target mission-critical cybersecurity    employees with unusually high or unique qualifications.   Ineligible employees received incentive payments, which  ranged from approximately $21,000 to $25,000 annually.  • CISA’s Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) did not maintain records of Cyber Incentive recipients and  corresponding payments. • CISA did not comply with Federal regulations and multiple  program requirements, resulting in $1.41 million in unallowed back payments to 348 Cyber Incentive recipients,  which we identified as questioned costs.  

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

The OIG conducted this review after receiving a hotline allegation that the 2024 emergency department expansion and renovation at the Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans’ Hospital in San Antonio, Texas, did not meet standards. Some exam rooms were said to put patients at risk because the rooms were not equipped for urgent care.

The OIG confirmed the allegation. Fast-track exam rooms, used to quickly assess and treat patients with minor injuries or illnesses, did not have permanent medical air, oxygen, and vacuum outlets, nor did all the rooms have acceptable exam lights. In addition, in one room the contractor failed to install the required plumbing for permanent medical air, oxygen, and vacuum lines. The deficiencies occurred in part because the VHA directive guiding minor construction projects did not incorporate the legal requirement that the director of the Office of Construction and Facilities Management (CFM) manage and oversee the project. Other factors included the contractor’s use of the wrong template to design fast-track rooms and the project engineer’s approval of the room that lacked required plumbing.

When fast-track rooms and procedural and general exam rooms lack the necessary equipment for emergency care, patient care may be delayed while healthcare professionals locate portable equipment. VA officials agreed with the OIG’s four recommendations to ensure processes and guidance are in place for the CFM to provide appropriate oversight and management over minor construction projects, revise the VHA directive on minor construction projects to incorporate legal requirements, review emergency department exam and fast-track rooms for compliance with standards, and review a CFM assessment of emergency department for compliance with design and equipment requirements.

In its fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget request, VA identified the need for the Palo Alto major construction project to improve seismic safety at the Palo Alto Health Care System. The planned construction project would also provide ambulatory and polytrauma care. Over the next 15 years, the project’s cost and timeline increased. The OIG conducted this review to evaluate the significant events that led to cost increases, schedule slippages, and scope changes for the major construction project.

The OIG found VA has still not achieved two of its three critical project objectives and is more than 21 years behind its original schedule. As of February 2025, about $458.8 million had been spent on the project. Furthermore, because VA did not provide adequate justification for a significant scope increase proposed in the FY 2012 budget, the OIG questioned the expenditure of about $716.6 million. To proceed with the project, VA will need a total of about $1.6 billion.

Cost increases and delays occurred because VA did not have adequate formal procedures for governing major construction projects from 2009 to 2017. The OIG could not obtain evidence that the Palo Alto project was ever added to the Acquisition Program Management Framework, as required. VA must consider whether it is worth continuing the project or canceling efforts to complete it. Should VA be unable to justify the business need to continue funding the project, the OIG determined taxpayers could save about $907.8 million.

The OIG made four recommendations to the VA Secretary including ensuring the project is brought into the Acquisition Program Management Framework and ensuring a decision is made about the project’s future. VA concurred with the OIG’s recommendations.